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BOOK REVIEW
NEW JERSEY PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW.

VIRGINIA:

BY BARRY M. EPSTEIN, CHARLES J. WALSH, MARC S. KLEIN AND
STUART M. FEINBLATT. MICHIE-BUTTERWORTH CO., 1994.
TWO-VOLUME TREATISE INCLUDING APPENDICES, TABLE OF
CASES AND INDEX. $190.00
REVIEWED BY: THE HONORABLE MYRON
& JONATHAN

S.

H.

BRIGHT*

ROSEN**

This well-written and well-organized two-volume treatise on New
Jersey product liability law provides invaluable assistance to the
practitioner (both experienced and newcomer) and the academic alike.
Although focusing on New Jersey law, the treatise addresses a broad
range of practice and procedural issues commonly encountered in
product liability litigation. The authors, Barry M. Epstein, Charles J.
Walsh, Marc S. Klein, and Stuart M. Feinblatt, long-standing practitioners
in this field, have successfully organized the material and provided a
useful and detailed index. Because product liability law derives from
general propositions of tort law, the book may also be of assistance in
the broad area of New Jersey tort law. Attorneys in other jurisdictions
may also find the treatise helpful in gaining familiarity with New Jersey
law, as the book provides a comprehensive explication of New Jersey
product liability law.
The treatise explains and provides annotations for important
theories of product liability such as manufacturing defects, design
defects, failure to warn, strict liability, and negligence under New Jersey
law. In addition, the authors address proof of liability, causation,
damages, contribution, and indemnification. The text covers substantive
rules including the New Jersey Product Liability Act,l cites all leading
New Jersey product liability cases, explains them in simple terms, and
emphasizes the basic public policy and doctrinal considerations
underlying these principles. The book also identifies national trends and
provides other sources to consider if, as often occurs, New Jersey courts
have not directly addressed the issue. The book is especially helpful in
* United States Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
University of Minnesota School of Law, J.D. 1947; Professor Emeritus, St. Louis University School of
Law.
** Associate, Shearman & Sterling, New York, N.Y.; Law Clerk to the Honorable Myron H.
Bright, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1994-1995; Law
Clerk to the Honorable Alex T. Howard, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama, 1992-1993; New York University School of Law, J.D. 1992.
1. NJ. REV. STAT. § 2A:58C (1987).
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answering practical legal questions and, of most use to a practitioner,
provides a thorough appendix containing helpful forms, such as sample
complaint and jury demands, as well as sample plaintiff and defendant
interrogatories.
In addition, the text contains an invaluable and
time-saving chapter devoted to factual research in product liability cases,
explaining the necessity of factual research and describing many of the
resources with which such research may be performed.
The authors have years of experience in this area, extensive
nationwide trial and appellate experience, and are members of the
prominent firm of Sills Cummis Zuckerman Radin Tischman Epstein &
Gross, which has a renowned and active product liability practice. The
authors have represented both plaintiffs and defendants in product
liability cases, and, as a result, the treatise has a balanced treatment of
issues.
An outline of the chapters in the treatise and the invaluable
appendices will demonstrate the broad expanse of this valuable work. In
Chapter 1, the authors review the development of modern product
liability law from the early jurisprudence in this country. The authors
trace the evolution from Winterbottom v. Wright 2 to MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Company3 and the New Jersey landmark decision of
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,4 which rejected the privity
requirement for recovery of damages for a defective product, 5 to other
progressive cases embodying strict liability, which ultimately became the
general rule of strict liability law reflected in Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 6 These developments and refinements
thereon found their way into New Jersey's statutory enactment of its
Product Liability Act (PLA) in 1987.7
In subsequent chapters, this text discusses and brings the reader up
to date on developments and recent case law regarding parties to PLA
lawsuits; 8 theories of liability under the PLA;9 a detailed explanation of
liability or non-liability for a manufacturing defect; 10 design defect;11
failure of proper warning;12 matters of proof of liability;13 causation,
2. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
3. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y.1916).
4. 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960).
5. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 81 (NJ. 1960).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
7. NJ. REV. STAT. § 2A:58C (1987).
8. 1 EpsTEIN, ET AL., supra note 7, §§ 2.01-2.32
9. Id. §§ 3.01-3.09.
10. Id. §§ 4.01-4.05.
11. Id. §§ 5.01-5.40.
12. Id. §§ 6.01-6.23.
13. 1 EPSTEIN, Er AL., supra note 7, §§7.01-7.31.
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both in fact and as proximate cause; 14 the possibility of non-liability
based on plaintiff's conduct;1 5 all aspects of damages including
compensatory and punitive; 16 and finally the somewhat opaque and
difficult area of contribution and indemnity.17
Volume II opens with valuable and helpful appendices for the
lawyer engaged in this particular tort litigation. The authors include a
sample complaint for the plaintiff,' 8 a sample answer and counterclaim,19
carefully tailored sample interrogatories helpful to the plaintiff and
interrogatories which will guide defendant's discovery, 2 0 in part,
followed by suggested jury instructions. 2 1 Further appendices provide
the text of the Act, 22 its legislative history 2 3 plus a table of contents, table
of cases, an index, and a bibliography keyed to specific chapters.2 4 The
additional textual material in Volume II includes the practice and
procedure in PLA cases, covering every aspect of bringing, trying, and
25
defending the case.
Chapter 13 discusses other related consumer protection laws, both
federal and state, 26 and the text in Chapter 14 takes the reader to the
related subject of insurance for product liability, concluding with an
interesting and helpful discussion on the research necessary in these
often complex cases. 27 The authors did not limit their research to the
statutes and case law alone, but also make available sources of scientific
and technological literature, government and industry publications, and
many other avenues of investigation. 28
The task of bringing and defending a product liability case may
often represent a high intellectual challenge to the trial lawyer. For the
less experienced lawyer or the expert in this sort of tort litigation, this
treatise gives the necessary tools and information for competent legal
service for the client. This work brings the reader up to date with the
significant state and federal cases important to litigating these cases. The

14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. §§
Id. §§
Id. §§
Id. §§

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

2 EPSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 7, at A-I to A-6.
Id. at A-7 to A-10.
Id. at A-IlI to A-38.
Id. at A-39 to A-51.
Id. at A-53 to A-56. See also NJ. REV. STAT. § 2A:58C (1987).
2 EPSTEIN, ET. AL., supra note 7, at A-57 to A-63.
Id. at T-3 to T-31; B-I to 12, 1-1 to 1-34.
Id. §§ 12.01-12.86.
Id. §§ 13.01-13.25.
Id. §§ 14.01-14.09.
2 EPSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 7, §§ 15.01-15.21.

8.01-8.13.
9.01-9.08.
10.01-10.32.
11.01-11.19.
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volumes will be supplemented annually. The case law is current for New
Jersey cases to March 1, 1994.
Lawyers practicing product liability or general tort law, as well as
others in need of information on New Jersey product liability law, should
consult this excellent treatise.

HOLDING A GREAT VISION:
ENGAGING THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VOICE OF TRIBAL COURTS
BRAID OF FEATHERS:

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND

CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE.

By Frank Pommersheim.* Berkeley & Los Angeles, California:
University of California Press, 1995. Pp. ix-267.
REVIEWED BY

I.

N. BRUCE DuTHu**

INTRODUCTION
Frank Pommersheim's book,

BRAID OF FEATHERS:

AMERICAN INDIAN

(1995), fills a critical gap in the
modern literature on tribal governments by offering "an inside-out view
from the grassroots, reservation level rather than the traditional top-down
view that permeates most Indian law writing."' The preponderance of
the legal scholarship in this field focuses on how law, specifically federal
law, impacts on Indian people and tribal governments. 2 This development is probably not surprising given the federal government's vast
influence in Indian affairs dating to post-colonial times. Professor and
Dean Rennard Strickland has noted, for example, that:
[flederal law dominates Indian life in a way that is not duplicated. The nature of public law and Indian policy is such that
legal questions are central to all tribal, social, economic, and
political issues. The very existence of Indian tribes, for example, is perceived by many to be in the hands, not of tribal members, but of administrators applying laws enacted by
non-Indian lawmakers. Historically, tribes have had neither the
initiative nor the control over the events that dictate their destinies. Such control historically has rested in the hands of the
federal courts. Thus, law looms large in the life of the Native
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE

American.3
* Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School of Law.

** Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School.
1. FRANK PommERsHmm, BPRAID OFFEATHERS: AMERICAN I NDtAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL

LIFE 2 (1995).
2. The literature regarding tribal governments is voluminous, but includes the rich work of VINE
DELORIA, J R. & CLIFFORD L YTLE, AMERICAN I NDtANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE (1983) (explaining the Indian
judicial system as it has come to be in our time); CHARLES F. W ILKNSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TiME AND

THE LAW (1987) (establishing the interrelationship of Indian law, history, and policy); ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1990) (concerning the function and

effect of Western colonial law on the development of federal Indian law).
3. Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native
American Experience, 34 KAN. L. REV. 713, 738 (1986). Of course, the existence, extent and exercise
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A few works, primarily by historians and political scientists, have
substantially advanced our understanding of the nature and historical
development of tribal governments with specific attention directed to
issues of internal tribal politics, tribal reactions to, and adaptive strategies
4
pursued in light of an ever-growing federal hegemony in Indian affairs.
These are major contributions in which tribes are revealed as active,
complex, and dynamic entities, keenly aware of the dramatic changes
occurring around them and of the inevitability of adjustments to the new
order. 5 Certainly, a few legal scholars have devoted attention to
tribally-based law and the evolution of tribal legal institutions, 6 but by
and large, this literature exists in the law reviews and is thus not widely
available for consumption by a larger audience. 7
Pommersheim's BRAID OF FEATHERS thus represents an important
and overdue entry into the canon of contemporary scholarship on
of federal power over Indians has not gone unchallenged by tribes or legal scholars. See generally
Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 195 (1984) (considering the undue deference to congressional power over Indians and the
unique nature of tribal claims); Mark Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 57 (1991) (concerning Congress' plenary power over Native
Americans).
4. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE POLITICS OF INDIAN REMOVAL: CREEK GOVERNMENT AND
SOCIETY IN CRISIS (1982); COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN INDIAN COrNTRY: CRISIS
AND DivERsrry IN NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (1995); SHARON O'B RIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL
GOVERNMENTS (1989). See also KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY:
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941).

5.

CALLOWAY, supra note 4. at xiv-xv. Professor Calloway writes:
When Indian chiefs told the Spanish governor of Saint Louis in 1784 that the American
Revolution constituted "the greatest blow that could have been dealt us," they were
talking about a real event and they called it that, but for them the important point about
the Revolution was the flood of American settlers it unleashed onto their lands ....
The
meaning of the Revolution, for them, was very different; the event itself was all too real.

Id.
6. See, e.g., SIDNEY L. HARRNG, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW,
AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1994); RENNARD S TRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE
SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT (1975).

7. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225
(1994); Michael Taylor, Modern Practicein the Indian Courts, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 231 (1987);
James W. Zion, The Navajo Peacemaker Court: Deference to the Old and Accommodation to the
New, 11 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 89 (1983); Robert Laurence, Dominant-Society Law and Tribal Court
Adjudication, 25 N.M. L. REV. 1 (1995); Philmer Bluehouse & James W. Zion, Hozhooji Naat'aanii:
The Navajo Justice and Harmony Ceremony, 10 MEDIATION Q. 327 (1993); Emily Mansfield, Balance
and Harmony: Peacemaking in Coast Salish Tribes of the Pacific Northwest, 10 MEDIATION Q. 339
(1993).
BRAID OF FEATHERS itself builds substantially on Pommersheim's earlier published works in

various legal journals. See Frank Pommersheim, A Path Near the Clearing: An Essay on
ConstitutionalAdjudication in Tribal Courts, 27 GoNZ. L. REV. 393 (1991-1992); Frank Pommersheim,
Liberation,Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 WIs. L. REV. 411;
Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place: A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D. L. REV. 246 (1989);
Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts and the Role of the
Tribal Bar as an InterpretiveCommunity: An Essay, 18 N.M. L. REv. 49 (1988); Frank Pommersheim,
The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction,31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329 (1989).
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Indian law. The book focuses attention on tribal courts, those "frontline
tribal institutions that most often confront issues of self-determination
and sovereignty." 8 The work of tribal courts and the historical, social,
and cultural setting in which they operate provide the framework for
Pommersheim's larger discourse on the meaning of tribal sovereignty,
and the pursuit of justice in everyday matters. Tribal sovereignty,
according to Pommersheim, must be "(re)conceptualized" 9 so as to
become an affixed strand in this country's "foundational web of
beliefs."' 10 This does not mean that tribal sovereignty suffers no
setback; instead,
it means that [tribes'] basic sovereignty is recognized as permanent, enduring, and located in, and vouchsafed by, the federal constitution. Only when this status is widely accepted will
it be truly possible to determine the specifics of tribal sovereignty in the thick detail and practice of adjudicating individual cases, just as it occurs in the context of state and federal sovereignty. 1
Pommersheim's perspective is unique, his candor absolutely refreshing. He is an "outsider become insider" who arrived in 1973 to
live and work on the Rosebud Sioux Reservation and now serves as an
Appellate Justice for both the Rosebud and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal
Courts of Appeal. "These facts, " he says, "affect what I say."' 12 Indeed, having made a case for the pivotal role tribal courts play, not just
in the daily administration of justice, but as vital links in the contemporary discourse of tribal sovereignty, Pommersheim is understandably
self-conscious about his personal role as a tribal jurist:
When I sit as an appellate justice at either the Rosebud Sioux or
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation, I find the experience both
moving and unique. Regardless of the dimensions and issues
of the cases, these events represent tribal sovereignty in action.
An important and significant tribal institution adjudicates particular cases and in the process enacts a critical judicial and
cultural discourse on the meaning of law, justice, and tribal
sovereignty within a localized reservation perspective. It is this
8. POMMERSHEIM, BRAID oF FEAwTERs, supra note 1, at 57.

9. Id. at 56.
10. Id. at 132.
11. Id.at 133.
12. Id. at 204 n.14. Pommersheim adds, "The experience did not make me blind to problems on
the reservations; instead, it has deepened my understanding of their etiology and increased my
appreciation of the values and commitment embodied in Lakota history and culture." Id. at 205 n.14.
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incremental process that weaves piece by piece the sturdy and
vital fabric of tribal sovereignty.13
The book takes a contemplative, not prescriptive approach in situating tribal courts within the domain of modern-day tribal government.
There is a consciousness about process and about time; Pommersheim
recognizes that for tribal courts, the attainment of respect and legitimacy-in both the tribal and non-tribal worlds-is ongoing work. In
Cardozo's terms, it is "an endless 'becoming.""14
Many strands of thought make up BRAID OF FEATHERS. This critique
will examine two in some detail: (a) the notion that tribal courts constitute "frontline tribal institutions" in addressing issues of
self-determination and sovereignty1 5 and (b) the notion that tribal court
narrative and legal storytelling provide "perhaps the most trenchant
means of confronting federal hegemony in Indian law".1 6 Other themes
developed in the book may find articulation in these two broad areas.
This exploration proceeds, as does BRAID OF FEATHERS, along a path paralleling the discourse on cultural and political pluralism, what
Pommersheim calls "the dilemma of difference."1 7 Tribes clearly do
not operate in a vacuum; rather, they function under the glare of an
omnipresent federal legal and political apparatus whose approach to
13. POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 1,at 59.
14. BENImiN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 28 (192 1). On the relative youth

of formal tribal courts, Pommersheim says. "[plart of the benefit of such relative youth is that they
have the ability to chart the future on their own terms. Tribal courts are in the process of becoming;
they are not calcified into any particular form."

POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 1, at 78.

Pommersheim is interested, as were Cardozo and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in the nature of law and
the legal process. While Pommersheim does not himself draw the parallels, his intellectual indebtedness, particularly to Holmes, is revealed when he argues for a "postformalist concept of contextual
legitimacy" for tribal courts, id. at 67, one that eschews formalistic, even ossifying, applications of
rules of law to a concept which "looks to the social, historical, and cultural setting of judicial
adjudication that provides a most fruitful framework for examining tribal courts and tribal court
adjudication." Id. at 66-67. In his book, THE COMMON LAW, of course, Oliver Wendell Holmes made a
similar frontal assault on the-then dominant utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. Holmes wrote:
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 1 (1881). He added: "The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellowmen, have had a good deal more to do than syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed." Id.
Cardozo's notion of an "endless becoming" has an interesting parallel in Navajo philosophy. In
describing the Navajo process of peacemaking, Bluehouse and Zion reference the concept of
"hozho," a Navajo legal term which "measures the state of being in complete harmony and peace. It
provides the framework of Navajo thought and justice. It takes into account both the hashkeeji
naat'aah (war planning or war philosophy) and hozhooji naat'aah (peace planning or peace
philosophy). Hozho is the balance obtained from these two plans." Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 7, at
331.
15. POMMErSitEim, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supranote 1, at 57.
16. Id. at 108.
17. Id. at 101.
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tribal self-governance may well be, as Professor Judith Resnick says, a
function of "how much 'subversion' and 'invention' should be tolerated and encouraged."1 8 This perspective anchors the discussion of tribal
sovereignty in the real world and positions this book to be a force for
positive and respectful relations among tribes, states, and the federal
government into the next century.
II.

"IT IS HARD TO HOLD A GREAT VISION"-CRAZY HORSEI9
A.

LOOK TOWARD

THE FUTURE: TRIBAL COURTS AS "FRONTLINE

INSTITUTIONS" IN THE QUEST FOR TRIBAL SELF-DETEMINATION

From Pommersheim's perspective, tribal courts bear an immense
charge: "[T]hey are the primary tribal institutions charged with carrying the flame of sovereignty and self-government." 20 Broadly speaking,
tribal courts effectuate this responsibility by articulating a vision for
indigenous self-governance within the pluralistic republic of the United
States.
Pommersheim acknowledges that the tribal vision of
self-determination, which "includes the authority to govern all individuals and property found within the reservation's borders," 2 1 is at odds
with the "sovereignty of sufferance" theory espoused by the United

18. Id. at 100 (citing Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns:
FederalCourts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671,750 (1989)).
19. Strickland, supra note 3, at 748-49.
20. PommmeSHmIM, BRAID OF FEATHERs, supra note 1, at 79.
21. Id. at 125.

Indian Tribes, States, and the
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States Supreme Court. 22 This precarious notion of tribal power must
first be corrected, says Pommersheim, before any meaningful refinement

22. Id. at 54. The expression derives from language in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313
(1978). The Wheeler court stated: "The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and
limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.
But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers." 435 U.S. at 323.
All members of the court joined Justice Potter Stewart's decision in Wheeler, reversing the
lower courts (Justice Brennan did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case). Justice
Thurgood Marshall, who initially voted to affirm the lower court, had these interesting observations
about the nature of tribal sovereignty:
I tentatively vote to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. While I believe
that tribes retain certain rights of self-government through a residual sovereignty not
deriving from the federal Constitution but preexisting it, I do not at this time think that
different sources of sovereignty necessarily require application of the "dual
sovereignty" doctrine of Abbate. What strikes me as peculiar about the relationship
between the tribes and the federal government is the plenary nature of Congress'
authority to act vis-a-vis the tribes. Unlike the states, whose sovereignty (and
concomitant police power) is protected and recognized in the Constitution, the tribes
continue to possess any criminal jurisdiction at all wholly at the sufferance of the federal
government (absent limiting treaty language); and Congress has enacted numerous
statutes arguably controlling the tribes' criminal jurisdiction, and the manner in which
such jurisdiction is exercised.
For these reasons, I am presently inclined to believe that the relationship between
the tribes and the United States is more comparable to that of the territories and the
United States, or municipalities and states, than it is to that of the states and the federal
government, which, as the SG's office has conceded, are the only full sovereign powers
in the United States. My vote is tentative, however, since the majority opinion in this case
or developments in Oliphant or Santa Clara may persuade me otherwise. T.M.
Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Conference, Re: No. 76-1629 United States v.
Wheeler (Jan. 16. 1978) (on file in Thurgood Marshall Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript
Library, Washington, D.C.) (citations omitted). It should also be noted that Justice Stewart's first draft
of the Wheeler opinion, circulated March 1, 1978, contained the "sovereignty of sufferance"
language but broadened it from Marshall's apparent limitation to criminal jurisdiction to encompass the
general sovereignty of Indian tribes. See Justice Potter Stewart, First Draft Majority Opinion, United
States v. Wheeler 1 (March 1. 1978) (on file in Thurgood Marshall Collection, Library of Congress
Manuscript Library, Washington, D.C.).
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of our notion of tribal sovereignty can be attempted; 2 3 he suggests a
24
constitutional amendment explicitly recognizing tribal sovereignty.
23. POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note I, at 132-33.
24. To this extent, Pommersheim's argument echoes the sentiments expressed by Justice Marshall
in his Memorandum to the Conference in the Wheeler case. Marshall noted in pertinent part, "Unlike
the states, whose sovereignty (and concomitant police power) is protected and recognized in the
Constitution, the tribes continue to possess any criminal jurisdiction at all wholly at the sufferance of
the federal government (absent limiting treaty language)[.]" (emphasis added) Memorandum from
Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Conference, Re: No. 76-1629 United States v. Wheeler (Jan. 16,
1978) (on file in Thurgood Marshall Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript Library, Washington,
D.C.). But less than two months later, Marshall reversed himself in a dissenting opinion published in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). In Oliphant, the majority of the Supreme
Court held that Indian tribes have no inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 435 U.S. at 212.
Justice Marshall (joined by then Chief Justice Burger) dissented stating that "[in the absence of
affirmative withdrawal by treaty or statute, I am of the view that Indian tribes enjoy as a necessary
aspect of their retained sovereignty the right to try and punish all persons who commit offenses against
tribal law within the reservation. Accordingly, I dissent." Id. (emphasis added). Marshall's own
papers do not reveal any explanation for the stunning reversal in his position on the scope of inherent
tribal criminal powers. Nor is there an explanation for Marshall's unfortunately brief dissenting
opinion in Oliphant. This "poverty of theory" as described by Pommersheim, in BRAID OF FEATHERS,
supra note I, at 48, is especially disheartening coming from Justice Thurgood Marshall, perceived by
some as "an effective advocate of tribal sovereignty." Robert Laurence, Thurgood Marshall's Indian
Law Opinions, 27 How. L. J. 3, 83 (1984). See also Rebecca Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, Civil Rights,
and the Sacred Text: The Legacy of Justice Thurgood Marshall's Indian Law Jurisprudence, 26 ARIZ.
ST.L. J. 495 (1994) (stating that Justice Marshall remained a major supporter of minority civil rights).
Correspondence from the Marshall papers reveals that on February 24, 1978, Chief Justice
Burger (as the senior justice in dissent in Oliphant) asked Justice Marshall to undertake a dissent. This
is the day after Justice Rehnquist circulated his first draft of Oliphant. On March 2, 1978. Burger
informed then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist (the author of Oliphant's majority opinion) that he
and Marshall would be content showing that the two dissented in the case. The next day, March 3,
Marshall wrote to Burger stating the following: "I decided that I feel more comfortable including a
short statement of my reasons for dissenting. I assume that this will not prevent the decision from
issuing on Monday [March 6, 1978]." Justice William Rehnquist, First Draft Majority Opinion,
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 1 (Feb. 23, 1978); Correspondence from Chief Justice Warren
Burger to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Feb. 24, 1978); Correspondence from Chief Justice William
Burger to Justice William Rehnquist (March 2, 1978); Correspondence from Justice Thurgood
Marshall to Chief Justice Warren Burger (March 3, 1978) (all materials on file in Thurgood Marshall
Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript Library, Washington, D.C.). A bench memo from one of
Marshall's clerks presents arguments on both sides of the jurisdictional issue, finds no clear legislative
or treaty history addressing the issue directly, and ultimately recommends that Marshall "affirm CA9
in holding that since Congress never took away tribe's criminal jurisdiction, they have it. But either
view has support." Bench Memo from "VJ." to Justice Thurgood Marshall, on Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe (undated) (on file in Thurgood Marshall Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript
Library, Washington, D.C.). A fair reading of this sparse paper trail and Marshall's own dissent in
Oliphant would indicate that Marshall concurred in the Ninth Circuit's reasoning upholding tribal
criminal authority over non-Indians and would not pursue the battle further.
Pommersheim's call for a constitutional amendment recognizing tribal sovereignty is not a new
proposal. RUSSELL LAWRENCE BARSH & J AMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN T RIBES AND
POLITICAL LIBERTY 279-82 (1980) (stating, "To guarantee the security of tribes, it is incumbent on
Congress and the people of the United States to resolve treaties into a single Constitution of undisputed
authority, presumably an amendment to our existing general Constitution."). Pommersheim offers little
in defense of his proposal beyond stating that a constitutional amendment would signify "the (ultimate)
majoritarian commitment to ensure the highest form of legal recognition and participation for Indian
tribes within this republic." POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 1,at 191. The proposal does
not address issues such as Congress' plenary power in Indian affairs (i.e. does it persist?); the
appropriate balance between state and tribal authority, particularly over non-Indians residing within
Indian Country; the nature of a "reconceptualized," id. at 45, federal-tribal trust relationship; or the
effect such a "constitutionalization" of tribal sovereignty would have on the concept of inherent tribal

1136

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71:1129

In this reviewer's judgment, Pommersheim's most significant contribution to the advancement of tribal sovereignty is his call for engaging
the tribal jurisprudential voice. The resulting judicial dialogue would
reaffirm the importance and vitality of the tribal decision-making apparatus and enhance the level of respect and deference accorded tribal
court decisions by federal and state courts.
This is not to suggest that tribal legislative bodies do not bear an
equally significant role in charting a path toward tribal
self-determination. The process of enacting legislation inevitably involves consideration of values and a careful articulation of the tribe's
sense of its political destiny. In this respect, BRAID OF FEATHERS does not
give tribal councils their due. Consider the recent case, City of Albuquerque v. Browner.2 5 In this action, the district court upheld the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decision to approve water quality
standards (WQS) promulgated by the Pueblo of Isleta under the Clean
Water Act. 26 In revising the city's permit for discharging pollutants into
the Rio Grande River, the EPA incorporated the tribe's WQS standards
27
which were considerably more stringent than federal or state standards.
In upholding EPA's action, the district court effectively gave voice to
Isleta's legislatively-determined concern for environmentalism. Professor James M. Grijalva provides this succinct and powerful summation of
Browner:

powers (i.e. would any powers not expressly committed to the federal government-and perhaps even
the states-be reserved to the tribes?). This criticism echoes that of Professor Robert N. Clinton, who
reviewed Barsh and Henderson. Robert N. Clinton, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 846 (1980) (reviewing RUSSELL
LAWRENCE BARSH & J AMEs YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITcAl. THEORY
(1980). Professor Clinton also noted that constitutional amendments require approval of three-fourths
of the states. Id. at 860 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. V). That approval seems doubtful as even
Pommersheim notes that there exists "a rule of enmity between the tribes and the state."
PoMMERSHiEm, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 1,at 144.
Perhaps mindful of this criticism, Pommersheim offers another option to strengthen tribal
sovereignty. He calls for a "hearkening back to the judicial hermeneutics of Chief Justice [John]
Marshall in the seminal Indian law cases." Id. at 191. Marshall's jurisprudence, the argument goes,
configures tribeswithin the national constitutional structure in ways that assure them a meaningful and
enduring presence. Id. Again, Professor Clinton's critique of Barsh and Henderson suggests that
renewed focus on the constitutional history of the Indian Commerce Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
3) may yield a similar result: "Such a focus would have brought THE ROAD back to the original
intention of the framers of the Constitution, to Chief Justice Marshall's recognition of exclusive federal
power to manage bilateral relations with the Indian tribes and of the sole right of the tribes to govern
their members and their internal affairs free from unwanted federal or state interference." Clinton,
47 U. CHI. L. REv. at 860. See generally, Philip P. Frickey, MarshallingPastand Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism,and Interpretationin FederalIndian Law, 107 HARv. L. REV. 381,383 (1993) (stating
that "federal Indian Law does not deserve its image as a tiring backwater of law inhabited by
impenetrably complex and dull issues.")
25. 865 F. Supp. 733 (D.N.M. 1993).
26. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F.Supp. 733, 742 (D.N.M. 1993). 33 U.S.C. § 1377
(1988) (codifying the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 100-4).
27. Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 739-40.

1995]

BOOK REVIEW: BRAID OF FEATHERS

1137

The moral of Browner is respect and its teaching is power. The
Pueblo of Isleta respected the Rio Grande as the source of life,
and sought to protect it by developing WQS. EPA respected
the Pueblo's value judgments in the appropriate uses of the
Rio, and the criteria necessary to protect them. The federal
district court respected Congress' intent to place the primary
responsibility for setting pollution standards for the reservation
environment on the shoulders of those who will bear the impact
of its degradation. The power, of course, lies in the Rio.28
Although Isleta's decision to promulgate its own water quality standards did not avert a legal conflict, it did provide the tribe with the opportunity to have tribally-determined eco-values considered and protected by the federal court. This result calls into question Pommersheim's
assessment that "[f]or the Native American reverence for the life and
spiritual nature of all of creation to be truly meaningful, it must receive
legal recognition within tribal court jurisprudence. If it does not, the
observation embodies nothing more than a romantic cliche." 29 Browner demonstrates that this overstates the case for the tribal court's role and
undermines the tremendously important role of tribal councils. 30
Like tribal acts which are legislatively-determined, the tribal
jurisprudential voice must be examined "with reference to the tribal
perception of its struggle to render justice and fair play within Indian
country." 3 1 Federal constraints on tribal actions are not ignored but
rather placed in a "more limited (albeit forceful) context that achieves a
better balance and equilibrium from which to view emerging tribal court
development." 3 2 Thus, Pommersheim says, an "important goal of tribal
court jurisprudence is to produce a creative body of law that synthesizes
the best of the dominant legal system with the legal imperatives of tribal
28. James M. Grijalva, Tribal Governmental Regulation of Non-Indian Pollutersof Reservation
Waters, 71 N.D. L. REV. 433, 467 (1995).
29. POMMERSHEIM, BRAD OF FEATHERS, supra note 1, at 119.
30. Pommersheim's previous scholarship and jurisprudence as a tribal appellate judge indicate
that he is mindful of the important role of tribal legislative bodies. See, e.g. Frank Pommersheim &
Terry Pechota, Tribal Immunity, Tribal Courts, and the Federal System: Emerging Contours and
Frontiers,31 S.D. L. REV. 553 (1986) (discussing concerns for protecting individual civil rights in the
tribal context, Pommersheim states: "This need for reform and adjustment suggests that tribal
councils-within the letter and spirit of the Santa Clara Pueblo decision-develop parameters for
ICRA (Indian Civil Rights Act) litigation in tribal courts that provide room for meaningful redress
while maintaining institutional integrity." 31 S.D. L. REV. at 578; see also Thorstenson v. Cudmore, 18
Indian L. Rep. 6051 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1991) (giving no effect to a Bureau of Indian
Affairs-derived jurisdictional provision which "appear[ed] to undermine tribal sovereignty," the
appellate court stated: "It is also significant to note that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's most recent
statutory enactment takes a properly expansive view of its jurisdiction." Id. at 6053 n.8
31. PoMMEisHEtM, BRAID OF FEATHERs, supra note 1, at 2.
32. Id.
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history and culture, while at the same time avoiding dominant pressures
that would render such a synthesis irrelevant or contrary to the national
interest." 33 Stated differently, Pommersheim sees the work of tribal
courts as twofold: "to transcend the ravages of colonialism while
simultaneously animating traditional values in contemporary
circumstances ."34

Pommersheim sees within the tribal adjudicatory process a creative
potentiality for a tribally-inspired vision of self-governance. The
adjudicatory decision-making process itself is viewed as both
justice-rendering and values-revealing. That is, the rulemaker decides
the case before it consonant with extant laws, rules, and regulations, but
in the process, reveals or articulates values operative within the tribal
community. These values may include, in Pommersheim's experience,
"respect and dignity," 35 "giving and sharing," 36 "relatedness," 37
"compassion and humility" 3 8 and a focus on community bonds, not

individual rights or aspirations. 39
Pommersheim's conceptual framework thus presents tribal courts as
the fulcrum for the articulation of tribally-based values (what he terms
"scrutiny

from below" 4 0 ) tempered by a measured deference to

majoritarian ideals and expectations (usually imposed by the federal
government, what Pommersheim terms "scrutiny

from above" 4 1).

Achieving some sense of equilibrium between these two poles is the essence of the challenge facing tribal courts. It may also form the bedrock
for tribal court legitimacy in the eyes of both natives and non-natives.
Tribal court legitimacy; according to Pommersheim, is essentially a
function of the people's "demand for a legal and political system which
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id. at 103. Pommersheim echoes this dualism in two other instances: "[T]ribal courts must
strive to respond competently and creatively to both federal pressures and cultural values and
imperatives." Id. at 58. "[T]he two most important-indeed, complementary-projects in the field of
contemporary Indian law are the decolonization of federal Indian law and the simultaneous
construction of an indigenous version of tribal sovereignty and self-rule." Id. at 193. The repetition
may be an intentional stylistic device to emphasize an obviously significant point. Readers familiar
with Pommersheim's traditional scholarship, (i.e. material appearing in law reviews) may recall the
theme occurring in discrete articles, portions of which are substantially reproduced to form the present
book. The book is indeed a pastiche of Pommersheim's previous scholarship, disparate pieces
sensitively and creatively woven together to produce a coherent, and only occasionally repetitive,
portrait of contemporary tribal governments. Pommersheim acknowledges this from the beginning:
"Somewhat unexpectedly, I have been at work for many years on this book, even when I didn't think I
was working on it. Many pieces came together to make the whole." Id. at ix.
35. Id. at 5.
36. PoMMERsHtMm, BRAID oF FEATHERs,
supra note 1, at 14.
37. Id. at 118.
38. Id. at 187.
39. Id. at 186.
40. id. at 96.
41. PoMMERsHatM, BRAID oF FEATHERs. supra note 1, at 96.
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on the whole enjoys and merits [the peoples'] allegiance." 4 2 Identifying "the people" whose allegiance is sought, is complicated by a history
of tribal governmental structures essentially. imposed by the federal government on tribes 4 3 and a contemporary demographic profile of Indian
country which includes substantial populations of nonnative residents on
reservation lands. 4 4 "These combined forces," says Pommersheim,
"often threaten the viability of tribal courts as legitimate
justice-rendering institutions. Regardless of competence and commitment, legitimacy becomes illegitimacy when large numbers of people in
fact cease to recognize an obligation to abide by laws or judicial deci45
sions with which they disagree."
Pommersheim sees tribal court legitimacy as "inextricably bound
to their amenability to change and reform. This adaptability serves to
increase the perception in both the Indian and non-Indian community of
the development of a more orderly and just system and society. This
enhanced perception has actively drawn from both streams -traditional
46
and progressive-of discontent."
Unquestionably, flexibility within tribal court adjudication serves to
maintain a sense of dynamism, indeed relevance, to the rulemaking
enterprise. There are potential problems, however, which Pommersheim
does not sufficiently redress. It is not clear, for example, at whose
instance tribal courts should remain "amenable to change" or what
elements of the tribal adjudicatory process may be subject to change.
The relative youth of tribal courts usually correlates to a paucity of legal
precedent for most issues. For Pommersheim, this represents an
opportunity for "innovative and creative lawyering" aimed at
establishing "an enduring tribal jurisprudence . . . [not] a colonial

jurisprudence of imitation." 47 Tribal court jurisprudence should be
especially vigilant about guarding the interests of political "outsiders,"
usually tribal nonmembers. 48 This is laudable but can create serious
tensions for a tribal court attempting to animate tribal values which may
conflict with individual claims. But these conflicts must be confronted
directly; Pommersheim warns that tribal inaction in the face of these
conflicting claims "might aggravate the perception of illegitimacy by

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 67.
Id. at 61-66.
Id. at 19-23.
Id. at 68.

46. POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 1, at 68.

47. Id. at 129.
48. Id. at 73.
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tribal members and many non-Indians and could result in further federal
49
standards encroaching on tribal sovereignty."
Are there extant signs that tribal courts enjoy a growing legitimacy?
Pommersheim thinks so and he points to a few specific examples: (1)
50
the increase of law-trained Indian people within many tribal systems;
5
1
(2) the revision of tribal codes and constitutions; (3) the development
of traditional and customary law;5 2 and (4) continued recognition of
tribal courts by the United States Supreme Court "as viable and important forums for resolution of reservation-based claims involving both
Indians and non-Indians." 5 3 This last example merits closer attention
given the patent inconsistency of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in
Indian law.
B.

LEGITIMACY, TRIBAL COURTS AND THE SUPREME COURT

Tribal court legitimacy in the eyes of the United States Supreme
Court arguably reached its apogee in National Farmers Union Insurance
Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians54 and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v.
LaPlante.SS These cases essentially provide a means for litigants to chal49. Id. at 74. See, e.g., S. 517, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) and S. 2747, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1988) (outlining legislative proposals introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah to provide federal
court review of tribal decisions pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (25 U.S.C. §§
1301-1326 (1983))).
50. POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 1.at 70-71.
51. Id. at 74. Pommersheim notes examples of substantive revisions throughout the text, e.g.
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe amending its constitution to provide for formal separation of powers. Id.
at 74. In addition, some tribal courts have urged their lawmaking bodies to exercise more diligence in
drafting laws. See, e.g., Bowen v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe. 21 Indian L. Rep. 6002, 6004 (Upper
Skagit Tribal Ct. App. 1990) ("It would be well-advised for the Upper Skagit Tribe to revise its
statutory definition of 'fishing' so that it speaks plainly in defining the prohibited conduct instead of
incorporating more obscure legal terminology."); Bennett v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, 18
Indian L. Rep. 6009. 6012 (Navajo 1990) ("When we discuss 'the ordinary person' we refer to the
ordinary Navajo person, who very often will be bilingual, with English as a second language. This
creates severe problems for statutory drafting because many Navajos would have a difficult time
easily comprehending the terms and usages found in many Navajo statutes. However, where an
individual claims rights or privileges which are fundamental, and where even officials administering
the law cannot understand the statute, there is a vagueness problem."); Woodard v. Goombi, 20 Indian
L. Rep. 6103, 6104 (Kiowa Ct. App. 1991) ("The question before the court is a simple one, however
given the ambiguous language of the Kiowa Constitution, the answer is not easily reached. This
dispute is but another indication of a need to overhaul and rewrite a tribal constitution due to unclear
and nonspecific terms. Many problems facing tribal governments today are due to a lack of clear and
detailed provisions in constitutions and a lack of adequate tribal codes.") (dissenting opinion of
Associate Magistrate Mikkanen); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Cook, 22 Indian L. Rep. 6037, 6037
(Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1995) ("This court . ..feels that it is necessary to make some
cautionary observations. First, the Rule at issue here is inartfully drawn.").
52. For an excellent examination of the development of traditional and customary law, see Gloria
Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225 (1994).
53. POMMERSHELM, BRAID OF FEATHERs, supranote 1,at 68.
54. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
55. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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lenge tribal court jurisdiction in federal court but only after exhausting
all available tribal court remedies. 56 Though the exhaustion requirement
recognizes an important juridical space within which tribal court jurisprudence can develop, the prospect of federal court review serves to
undercut the legitimacy and respect to be accorded these tribal entities
and their adjudicatory functions. 57 In this respect, Iowa Mutual's praise
for tribal courts ("Tribal courts play a vital role in tribal
self-government . ..and the Federal Government has consistently encouraged their development.") rings hollow. 58 Additionally, one must
recall that the Supreme Court characterized tribal courts much less charitably in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,5 9 the case holding that
tribes had no inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 60
Pommersheim views these cases as indicative of the Supreme
Court's struggle-whether deliberate or not-to articulate the proper
contours of the relationship between tribal courts and the federal
system. 6 1 The development, he feels, proceeds along paradoxical lines:

56. NationalFarmers ,471 U.S. at 857; Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19. Exhaustion of tribal court
remedies is required whether federal court jurisdiction is premised on "federal question," 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1993), or "diversity" jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1993).
57. National Farmersand Iowa Mutual have spawned a virtual cottage industry of scholarly
commentary. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the FederalUnion, 26WILLAMETrE L.
REV. 841 (1990). Professor Clinton criticizes the National Farmers Court for eschewing notions of
finality in allowing federal court review of tribal court actions. Id. at 879.
Prior to National Farmers Union, one therefore might have thought that any tribal court
adjudication that addressed and resolved questions of tribal court subject matter
jurisdiction would have been preclusive of federal court adjudication. Nevertheless,
without any significant consideration of such finality problems, questions that lie at the
heart of respectfor the authority and sovereignty of the courts of another sovereign, the
Court created a judge-made exhaustion rule that permits federal judges to directly
review the decisions of tribal courts on such important jurisdictional questions.
Id. (emphasis added). See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Deference Owed Tribal Courts' Jurisdictional
Determinations: Towards Co-Existence, Understanding,and Respect Between Different Cultural and
Judicial Norms, 24 N.M. L. REV. 191 (1994); Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies:
Extolling Tribal Sovereignty While Expanding FederalJurisdiction,73 N.C. L. REV. 1089 (1995); Lynn
H. Slade, Dispute Resolution in Indian Country: Harmonizing National Farmers Union, Iowa Mutual,
and the Abstention Doctrine in the FederalCourts, 71 N.D. L. REv. 519, 522 (1995).
58. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 14-15. The federal government, however, was not always so
hospitable. The 1898 Curtis Act. ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495, 504, abolished the tribal courts of the Five
Civilized Tribes. See generally FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 782 (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982) (discussing the impact of the 1898 Curtis Act on.the tribes); WILMA
MANKILLER & MICHAEL WALLIS, MANKILLER: A CHIEF AND HER PEOPLE 137 (1993) (discussing Indian

territory allotment and the 1898 Curtis Act).
59. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
60. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 35 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (stating that "[w]e also
acknowledge that with the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, which extends certain basic
procedural rights to anyone tried in Indian tribal court, many of the dangers that might have
accompanied the exercise by tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians only a few
decades ago have disappeared.").
61. POMmERsrIi, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 1,at 95.
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For example, onthe one hand there is increasing recognition
of the stature of tribal courts, but on the other hand there is the
companion development which seems to bring tribal courts
more directly into the orbit of federal review. Or to say it another way, the more important tribal courts become, particularly in their authority over non-Indians, the more need there
seems to be for increasing federal scrutiny. 62
Recall that Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez63 essentially left claims
premised on the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 to be adjudicated in
tribal court. 64 This result, argues one prominent Indian law scholar, may
cause some federal (and state) jurists to be ever more vigilant in protecting individual interests - particularly those of non-Indians - from "unchecked" tribal court action. 6 5 In other words, the result of Martinez
may actually lead to cases like National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, where aggrieved litigants have an opportunity to challenge the existence (not merely the exercise) of tribal jurisdiction in federal court, a
result which eschews notions of finality of decisions rendered by another
sovereign and undercuts the integrity of the tribal court system. This
leaves us with a conceptual framework for tribal-federal court relations
premised on suspicion and doubt, suspicion by federal court jurists (and
parties) that tribal courts can or will adjudicate fairly, doubt by tribal
court jurists that their decisions in such matters will be accorded respect
and finality.
Pommersheim's response to this quandry brings us back full circle:
Tribal actions must be mindful of scrutiny from "above" (federal) and
from "below" (the culture and tribal people themselves). He states,

62. Id.
63. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
64. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). Federal court jurisdiction over an ICRA
claim is limited to reviewing the legality of one's detention via habeas corpus, 25 U.S.C. § 1303
(1993). Martinez, like Iowa Mutual, takes a relatively charitable view of tribal courts: "Tribal courts
have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes
affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians." Martinez, 436
U.S. at 65 (emphasis added).
65. Robert Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment by Judicial, As
Opposed to Legislative Fiat and The Ironic Role of the Indian Civil Rights Act in Limiting Both, 71 N.D.
L. REV. 393, 412-13 (1995). In another article, Professor Laurence makes the connection between the
holdings in Martinez and National Farmers Union. Robert Laurence, Dominant-Society Law and Tribal
Court Adjudication, 25 N.M. L. REv. 1, 19 n. 73 (1995). "The former [Martinez] strips the federal
court of any ability to inspect tribal process to see if the judgment has been issued in conformity with
ICRA 'fairness.' The latter [National Farmers Union] leaves intact, though temporarily unexercised,
the ability of the federal court to deny tribal jurisdiction in its entirety. This seems backwards to
some." Id.
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While federal courts, rightly or wrongly, loom large in this
process, they ought not to be made more ascendant than they
lawfully are. In this regard, it is the wisdom and integrity of
tribal law and tribal courts, properly and consistently informed
by tradition and evolving contemporary tribal standards, that
will stand as the best bulwark against federal encroachment.
Without this continuing development, there can be little expec66
tation for stability and equilibrium.
This conceptual framework strives for a symbiotic relationship
between federal and tribal legal institutions, a relationship characterized
by mutual respect and trust. From the tribal perspective, the burden for
shoring up this symbiotic relationship must be borne by both the tribal
lawmaking bodies (i.e. the tribal councils) and the tribal adjudicatory
bodies (i.e. the tribal courts). Tribal courts surely cannot and should not
be situated to "go it alone." Pommersheim seems to acknowledge this,
however subtly, when he says "the wisdom and integrity of tribal law6 7
and tribal courts . . . will stand as the best bulwark against federal
encroachment." 6 8 Together, these institutions of tribal governance each according proper respect to their respective functions in the
administration of justice - can advance a vision of tribal self-governance
which animates tribally-inspired values and accords justice to all who
come within the ambit of tribal authority.
A major task for both tribal councils and tribal courts is to avoid the
conceptual slide towards institutionalizing what some call a form of "legal auto-genocide," a regime where federal hegemony predominates,
not through overt federal controls, but through mechanisms of tribal
self-restraint. 6 9 On this point, Pommersheim urges that:
[t]ribal communities must also realize that dialogue and negotiation with the state [and probably federal government] on legitimate issues is not a 'sell-out' of tribal sovereignty but simply part of the contemporary political and legal struggle to
achieve a tribal sovereignty that advances the flourishing of
tribal life. It is here that there needs to be continuing political

66. POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 1, at 96-97.
67. 1 read this to be positive expressions or enactments of law by the lawmaking bodies.
Certainly, tribal courts produce a corpus of enforceable law in their common law-making role. But if
this is the "tribal law" Pommersheim refers to, then he has placed, in my view, an unfair burden on
tribal courts to articulate a vision for tribal self-rule.
68. POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 1, at 97 (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr. The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence,1986 Wis. L. REV. 219,274.
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discussion within tribal communities and tribal councils to
forge a wide-ranging and thoughtful tribal public policy on
tribal-state relations, complete with specific goals, objectives,
and attendant strategies.
This encouragement is exactly on point. The political and legal
milieu within which tribes pursue their respective visions of indigenous
self-governance still contains potentially lethal traces of colonizing
agents and work must continue to "decolonize" the substantive body of
federal law which sets the larger contours for this discourse. 70 But that
process requires careful consideration of the everyday business of tribes
working towards and achieving incremental measures of
self-governance. And that everyday business includes tribal dialogue
with and consideration of the interests of all - tribal and non-tribal members of the tribal community.
Such is the "actual state of
things."7 !

III. TRIBAL COURT NARRATIVE AND LEGAL STORYTELLING:
CONFRONTING FEDERAL HEGEMONY IN INDIAN LAW
One aspect of contemporary dispute resolution in Indian country
that deserves more focused consideration is the "ethic of
noninterference." 7 2 That is, a proper respect for tribal court
adjudicatory functions, structures, and practices, necessarily will require a
relaxation of the federal (and state) impulse to interfere in the dispute
resolution systems of tribal communities.
Pommersheim argues that tribal court narrative and legal
storytelling provide useful avenues for accomplishing this result. He
states, "Tribal court narrative and legal storytelling provide perhaps the
most trenchant means of confronting federal hegemony in Indian
law." 7 3 Indigenous stories present a simple yet powerful means to
challenge dominant-culture assumptions about its own dispute resolution
systems while animating tribally-based cultural values. Duryea and Potts
offer the following story which articulates traditional values of
cooperation, respect and equality and also "conveys the fallacy of

70. Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized
Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 77-78 (1993).
71. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832).
72. Michelle LeBaron Duryea & Jim Potts, Story and Legend: Powerful Tools for Conflict
Resolution 10 MEDIATION Q. 387, 391 (1993).
73. POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS. supra note 1, at 108.
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imposing processes or systems without an understanding and respect for
traditional ways."74
A long time ago, this land was known as Turtle Island and
all the animals were children. One day the Spirit of the Sky
looked down, and he saw the geese were flying in a V. The
Spirit of the Sky did not like that very much. He thought to
himself, "That is very inefficient and it certainly does not look
very neat; from now on, the geese must fly in a straight line."
With that, the Spirit of the Sky went down and called all
the children of the geese together and said, "I have been
watching you fly in a V. As this is not neat or efficient, you
will now fly in a straight line."
The children of the geese were shocked and they said,
"But oh, Spirit of the Sky, we have always flown in a V. We do
this because the goose ahead breaks the wind for the one
behind and we do it so we can all watch each other so we know
all are safe."
This response angered the Spirit of the Sky and he replied,
"Enough of this! I said you will fly in a straight line, so that is
what you will do. Now pick one leader and do as I say!" To
this the geese replied, "But Spirit of the Sky, we do not have
one among us who is strong enough to lead all the time. We all
take turns being leader, gander or goose, it makes no
difference. We follow the one who is strongest at the
moment."
"If you do not have one who is strong enough to lead,
then I will be your leader." With that, the Spirit of the Sky
transformed himself into a large and powerful goose.
Soon, all the children of the geese were flying behind this
powerful leader. As they flew they came to realize that the
Spirit of the Sky was right. Flying in a straight line was more
efficient. It was easier, for now the air was broken for both
wings. They were traveling faster and actually did look a little
neater in the sky. And so it went for many days.
One day, high above, an eagle appeared. When the eagle
looked down and saw the geese, he said, "Ah-hah! The geese
are flying in a straight line. Today I eat!" And with that, the
eagle swooped down and took the last goose off the line. The
second last goose did not even notice that the last was gone.

74. Duryea & Potts, supra note 72, at 392.
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And so it went as the days went by and more and more of the
eagles came and kept picking the last goose off the line.
Eventually, the Spirit of the Sky reached his destination.
He landed and turned around to talk to his flock only to find
that he was all alone.
While all this was happening, the Creator was watching.
The Creator became very angry when he saw what the Spirit of
the Sky had done. He called the Spirit of the Sky to account
for his actions, and he said: "Spirit of the Sky, I am very
angry with you. You changed the way the children of the
geese had lived for thousands of years and now they are gone.
For that I hold you responsible."
In a trembling voice, the Spirit of the Sky said, "Oh,
Creator, it was not me who destroyed the children of the geese.
75
It was those eagles."
Tribal narrative certainly includes the corpus of cultural stories
which incorporate important traditional values and elements which bear
on larger matters of tribal history, identity, and destiny. 76
Tribal narrative may also serve as "counternarrative, one that
exposes colonial interference in tribal courts and its need to be properly
identified and corrected." 77 Pommersheim illustrates this point by
discussing a decision of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court of
Appeals, Thorstenson v. Cudmore.78 Thorstenson refused to give effect

75. Id. at 391-92. Duryea and Potts offer the legend to urge practitioners and trainers in conflict
resolution to "reevaluate the inclusivity and universality of their approaches." Id. at 392-93. The
same advice may be directed to those in responsible relations with Indian tribes. For a wonderful
illustration of how tribal narrative can influence law and policy (and scholarship), see Dean B.
Suagee, Turtle's War Party: An Indian Allegory on Environmental Justice, 9 J. ENvTL. L. & LMG. 461
(1994).
76. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6086, 6092 (Navajo 1989)
(showing the Navajo Supreme Court's incorporation of the traditional story of the Hero Twins in the
context of examining Navajo concepts of leadership and the characteristics of a "naat'aanii,"a
traditional leader); Davis v. Means, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6125, 6126 (Navajo 1994) (discussing the
central role of family to Navajo identity, clan structure and religious observance). The Davis case
was brought to establish paternity of a child. Id. The Navajo Supreme Court stated:
Knowing one's point of origination (meaning the parents) is extremely important to the
Navajo people, because only then will a person know which adoone 'e (clan) and dine'e
(people) the person is. Those precepts are essential to a Navajo's identity and must be
known for Navajo religious ceremonies. One must know them to seek hozho (harmony
and peace). When applied to a child, they are necessary for the child's emotional,
physical, and spiritual well-being. Thus, under Navajo common law, the child's best
interests require that the father be determined with reasonable certainty.
Id. at 6127.
77. POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERs, supra note 1, at 109.
78. 18 Indian L. Rep. 6051 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1991). Pommersheim was the
primary author of this opinion. See POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 1, at 237 n.36.
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to a provision of the tribal constitution which limited tribal authority
over non-Indians, largely due to historical considerations. The court saw
the constitutional provision as one generated not by "any considered
decision of the Cheyenne River Sioux people, but rather in some gross
BIA [Bureau of Indian Affairs] oversight or self-imposed (legal)
concern to tread cautiously when potential non-Indian interests were
involved. Neither of these concerns were authorized by federal statute
and ought not be given the force or respect of law."79
This is not revisionist history but rather an attempt by tribal
adjudicatory bodies to articulate a fuller, more accurate historical context
in which to resolve contemporary disputes. The work is critical in light
of the possibility of federal court review. It is imperative if tribes are
ever realistically to chart a path for self-determination into the next
century. As Professor Gloria Valencia-Weber eloquently states,
"Inaccurate narrative accounts of an indigenous people perpetuate
stereotypic burdens for American Indians. And when these accounts are
used to support legal decisions, the American Indians feel almost
irrevocable legal effects because of res judicata and stare decisis." 8 0
Pommersheim adds, "Without this opposing light, federal courts are all
too free to see such issues as problems of the tribes' own making rather
than a legacy of colonial dominance. This is not, however, to suggest
that all the problem or responsibility lies with the federal government,
but only that there is need for a new dialogue on the issues facing tribal
courts."81

Recent experience in the federal courts suggests at least some
federal jurists are responding to this call for greater jurisprudential
dialogue with tribal courts. In United States v. Tsosie, 2 Judge Hansen
decided to abstain sua sponte in an action for ejectment and trespass
filed in federal court. 8 3 The case involved two members of the Navajo
Nation who contested rights to an allotment of land located off the
reservation. Interestingly, all parties opposed abstention and the sole
issue was whether the court should abstain sua sponte. 8 4 The court noted
the importance of tribal courts having the first opportunity to resolve
79. Thorstenson, 18 Indian L. Rep. at 6053.
80. Gloria Valencia-Weber, American Indian Law and History: Instructional Mirrors, 44 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 251, 256 (1994). Professor Valencia-Weber illustrates the central role history plays in
Indian law. She cites United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), as a "provocative example"
of the use and potential abuse of history in the resolution of modem-day battles in Indian law. Id. at
260-61. For an excellent collection of essays on history and American Indians, see THE AMERICAN
INDIAN AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY (Calvin Martin ed., 1987).
81. PoMMERsHEtM, BRAtD OF FEATHERS. supra note 1,at 109.
82. 849 F.Supp. 768 (D.N.M. 1994).
83. United States v. Tsosie, 849 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.M. 1994).
84. Id. at 771.
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jurisdictional issues (citing National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual)8 5
and the important federal policy concerns animating the requirement for
exhaustion of tribal remedies. 86 One of those federal policy concerns is
to obtain the benefit of tribal expertise. 87 Defendant, Grace Tsosie, in
her pleadings, included a sworn declaration from Tom Tso, former Chief
Justice of the Navajo Supreme Court. 88 Judge Hansen, quoting
extensively from Justice Tso's declarations on Navajo custom, tradition,
history, culture, and common law, stated, "Justice Tso mentions that
Tsosie's rights to the land are based upon the consensus of her maternal
ancestors and states that this is a principle equivalent to res judicata. He
says that the burying of one's umbilical cord on land has 'profound
significance,' signifying a tie to Mother Earth." 89 Reliance on tribal
narrative and perspective clearly influenced Judge Hansen's ultimate
decision to abstain and allow the tribal court to resolve the matter as
evidenced by Hansen's concluding statements:
As a non-Navajo, unschooled in the foundations of Navajo
culture which, according to Justice Tso, constitute Navajo
common law, I am unqualified to interpret the law and rule on
many of the legal issues which should arise in this case. As
noted in the LaPlante case, tribal courts are best qualified to
interpret and apply tribal law. I believe this is the very type of
case which the Supreme Court had in mind in LaPlante and
National Farmers, when it mandated that federal courts abstain
in order to allow tribal courts the opportunity to fully develop
their own common law.90
85. Id. at 771 (citing Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); National Farmers Union
Ins. Co v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)).
86. Id. at 771-72. Three federal policy concerns are noted: "(1) to further the congressional
policy of supporting tribal self-government; (2) to promote the orderly administration of justice; (3) to
obtain the benefit of tribal expertise." Id. (citing National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856-57).
87. National FarmersUnion, 471 U.S. at 857.
88. Tsosie, 849 F. Supp. at 774.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 775 (citation omitted). Tribal courts employ counter-narratives in circumstances which
may limit the nature and type of claims or defenses litigants may use in tribal court. For example, in
Bowen v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6002 (Upper Skagit Ct. App. 1990), the
defendant tribal member challenged his conviction for fishing in a closed area, in part by seeking to
exclude some of his pretrial statements to tribal authorities. Id. The appellate court noted that the
exclusionary rule was formulated in the non-Indian community:
and therefore did not take into accord the common knowledge within the tribal
community. Within the tribal community tribal members have centuries' [sic] old
traditions relating to fishing and many practices are common knowledge within the
community. The close-knit nature of the tribe and common ancestral and cultural
background distinguishes the tribal community from the non-Indian community in
circumstances such as we have here. To say that the defendant didn't know he was
being arrested for fishing in a closed area when confronted with the tribal fisheries
patrol in the very early hours of the morning in a [sic] area customarily closed to tribal
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Judge Hansen's opinion demonstrates a profound respect for tribal
courts and the ethic of non-interference; one hopes many more
examples can be found. Pommersheim urges realism for these
expectations: "There is, of course, no telling what a federal reviewing
court might make of such stories embedded in tribal court
jurisprudence. And perhaps in these conservative times, expectations
should accordingly be minimized." 9 1 He also notes limitations with the
use of tribal narratives, limitations that inhere in the predominating
federal hegemony in Indian law: "[S]uch stories and opinions must be
properly anchored in the analytic processes of the law in order to be
both compelling and persuasive and to promote understanding and
respect."92

The value of tribal narratives and legal storytelling, then, is their
93
potential to animate tribally-based values, to serve as "jurisgenerative"
catalysts by which federal, state, and even tribal courts, validate, enforce,
and respect, tribally-derived interests. Ultimately, it boils down to
respect. The following story illustrates the point:
After the tragic loss of his twenty year old son, a father
made regular visits to his son's grave. On each visit, he would
follow the tribal custom of placing a gift on the burial mound.
For his son, a fresh fish, for he knew how he had once loved to
catch and eat fish.

fishing while carrying a sack with freshly caught fish, or with a person carrying freshly
caught fish, depending upon which witnesses one chooses,to believe, would require
failing to credit the defendant with average intelligence. Certain facts are so
well-known within the tribal community, particularly regarding fishing, that it would be
within the purview of this court to take judicial notice of them.
Id. at 6003. The court then addressed the broader matter of legitimacy of tribal court
adjudication:
At the core of the effectiveness of the tribal court is the fairness of the judgments it
renders and the respect afforded by the tribal community to these judgments and the
court. It serves no just purpose for the tribal community to allow a violator to be
acquitted for a minor technical error which did not effectively alter notice to the
defendant of rights which needed to be communicated to him.
Id. See also Stepetin, III v. Nisqually Indian Community, 20 Indian L. Rep. 6049, 6051 (Nisqually Ct.
App. 1993) (Irvin, CJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part.) The defendant tribal member in
Stepetin was prosecuted for reckless driving. Id. at 6049. He challenged the tribal law as
impermissably vague (the tribal law incorporated state law which did not conflict with the tribal code).
Id. at 605 1. Justice Irvin noted that the doctrine of vagueness originated in the non-Indian community.
Id. He noted, "Federal cases, state cases, and even those from other Indian reservations have little, if
any, applicability to the facts of the present case. One must interpret the disputed statute in the context
of the Nisqually Indian Community, a physically small and close-knit community of tribal people
whose lineage and customs have intertwined for hundreds of years." Id.
91. PoMMaasHEIm, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 1, at 11 1-12.
92, id. at 112.
93. PommEtsHEim, BRAttu OF FEATHERs at 101 (citing Judith Resnick, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHt. L. REv. 671,751 (1989)).
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Eventually these frequent offerings became a source of
amusement among the cemetery groundskeepers. One day as
the old man was laying a fresh fish on the grave, one of the
groundskeepers approached with a grin and said, "Hey old
man, when do you think that young fella is going to come up
and eat one of those fish?"
The old man looked at the groundskeepers and then at the
nearby non-Native graves and said, "Oh, about the same time
as some of those folks come up and smell those flowers." 94
Duryea and Potts offer an analysis of this story which aptly
summarizes many of Pommersheim's critical themes:
The response of the old man uses humor to suggest the
legitimacy of his behavior. It invites the creation of a shared
narrative in which respect for the dead can be incorporated into
any future dialogue. At the same time, it requires respect from
the listener. In effect, the response seeks to bridge the cultural
gap between the groundskeepers and the grieving old man.
Bridging like this is increasingly needed . . . both by parties
and by those who would intervene in conflicts. It is important
that new stories reconstructed in the cause of addressing
conflict be rooted in the history and values of a people.
Intervenors in intercultural conflicts thus face a complex and
challenging task. 95
IV. CONCLUSION
Everyone laughed at the impossibility of it,
but also the truth. Because who would believe
the fantastic and terrible story of all of our survival
those who were never meant to survive? 96
Pommersheim offers a challenge in BRAID OF FEATHERS to both the
tribal and non-tribal community. The challenge is how best to engage in
the process of re-envisioning our society, to move away from an
emphasis on polarization, division, stratification and towards conciliation,
unity, and respect. This is a process best begun and implemented in
small steps; after all, it took considerable time to construct the world we
94. Duryea & Potts, supra note 72, at 390.
95. Id.
96. Joy Harjo, Anchorage, in JOSEPH BRUCHAC,
INDIAN PoErs 90 (1987).
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live in and it will take even longer to reconstruct it - or at least,
re-envision it.
Pommersheim's important suggestion is to engage in dialogue,
particularly in the domain of law and politics. This domain represents
an important confluence of people (Indian and non-Indian), of
communities (tribal and non-tribal), of interests, histories, beliefs, and
values. Tribal courts operate in the center of this vast arena and they
engage in work of the highest order. To criticize BRAID OF FEATHERS for
focusing on tribal courts and not considering the significant role of
other tribal institutions, e.g. tribal councils - is not to suggest the book
has too narrow a focus, but only to reveal that the immense task ahead
must be borne, and is being borne, by the entire tribal political and legal
community. Tribal courts alone could not and should not shoulder the
burden of charting the path to tribal self-determination.
BRAID OF FEATHERS will probably be the non-legal community's first
introduction to tribal courts and their role in contemporary Indian life.
If so, it is an excellent introduction. The complexity of the legal issues,
the richness of the tribal voice, and the importance of engaging that
voice, are each addressed sensitively, intelligently, and meaningfully.
The book evokes the advice, some might say admonition, offered by the
noted Kiowa writer N. Scott Momaday:
Once in his life a man ought to concentrate his mind upon
the remembered earth, I believe. He ought to give himself up
to a particular landscape in his experience, to look at it from as
many angles as he can, to wonder about it, to dwell upon it. He
ought to imagine that he touches it with his hands at every
season and listens to the sounds that are made upon it. He
ought to imagine the creatures there and all the faintest
motions of the wind. He ought to recollect the glare of noon
and all the colors of the dawn and dusk.97

97. N. ScOTr MOMADAY, THE WAY

To RAINY MOUNTAIN 113 (1969).

